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The EU perspective not for Sarajevo? 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration with the European 
Union: opportunities, challenges and perspectives
In 2018 the European Union (EU) – presenting a new strategy for the enlargement 
policy, organizing the official summit of the state leaders and devoting to potential ac-
cessions the meeting of the Council – recalled that the future of the Western Balkans 
lies in the EU. The vision of an “European (Union) future” was announced to the 
Balkan countries fifteen years earlier, in 2003, when they were recognized as potential 
candidates for membership in the EU. According to the Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union, “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 
21 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union” 
(Treaty on European Union, article 49).
At the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the Balkan countries are at vari-
ous stages of their integration with the European Union. One of them – Croatia – joined 
the EU in 2013. Some were granted candidate statuses (Albania, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and started accession negotiations 
(Montenegro and Serbia). Others – Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo – are 
still considered as potential candidates. Nevertheless, in 2016 Sarajevo decided to ap-
ply for membership in the European Union.
Therefore, the main aim of this article is to analyze the possibility of joining the 
European Union by Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is necessary to identify – even if chosen 
– opportunities and challenges, perspectives and barriers (above all, on the political and 
economic level) on the path to further integration of Sarajevo with Brussels. The back-
ground to these considerations must be the European Union’s policy towards the Western 
Balkans region, which lost its dynamics with the beginning of the second decade of the 
21st century, and is trying to retrieve it for various reasons nowadays. Will Bosnia and 
Herzegovina benefit from the intensification of the EU’s enlargement policy?
Context: the European perspective of the Western Balkans
The European Union, which did not show its effectiveness in solving the armed 
conflict in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century, as a compensation for the 
1 Article 2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democ-
racy, quality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Treaty 
on European Union, article 2).
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countries of the Peninsula, decided to become more involved in the process of stabi-
lization and development of the region. The European Council in 1995 welcomed the 
singing of the Dayton agreement, ending the war in the former Yugoslavia, at the same 
time declaring its determination to support the implementation of the agreement (Pres-
idency Conclusions, December 1995). Soon (in February 1996) the EU decided to 
apply to the countries of the Western Balkans the so-called regional approach, that did 
not differentiate the EU’s policy towards particular countries in that area, and which 
emphasized the improvement and strengthening of political, economic and social rela-
tions between them (Petričušić, 2005, p. 5). In subsequent years, the EU institutions 
focused primarily on expressing satisfaction with the progress achieved by the Balkan 
states on their way to stabilization, alternately showing their concerns about the slow 
pace of changes, while at the same time declaring support for the initiated reforms 
(Presidency Conclusions, June 1996; Presidency Conclusions, June 1997; Presidency 
Conclusions, December 1998).
In the face of low effectiveness of the yet carried out activities (mainly in the form 
of regularly presented declarations, but also humanitarian aid and development coop-
eration), the impetus for the actual contribution in strengthening peace, stability and 
prosperity, as well as strengthening cooperation between the Balkan states, was to 
come in 1999. The European Council confirmed then “the readiness of the European 
Union to draw the countries of this region closer to the prospect of full integration into 
its structures” (Presidency Conclusions, June 1999). For this purpose the EU initiated, 
on 10 June 1999, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE) (Hombach, 
2000, passim) and, next, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which modi-
fied the regional approach to the Balkan states. More emphasis was put on the internal 
situation of individual countries. Their participation in the process and the level of its 
advancement resulted in greater incentives for interested countries, including financial 
ones (Schenker, 2008, p. 17).
The reality of the membership perspective was confirmed at the next summits of the 
European Council, for example in Lisbon (March 2000), Santa Maria de Feira (June 
2000), or at the EU – Western Balkans summit in Zagreb (November 2000). During that 
meeting the CARDS program was launched, for technical and financial assistance of 
the reconstruction, development and stabilization. For the years 2000–2006 4.65 billion 
EUR was allocated under this instrument. In 2007 the CARDS program was replaced 
by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), assuming support at the level of 
11.5 billion EUR in 2007–2013 and 11.7 billion EUR in 2014–2020 (Instrument).
In 2003, during the March summit of the European Council, it was clearly stated 
that, “the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union” (Presidency Con-
clusions, March 2003). In June the Council emphasized its “determination to fully 
and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, 
which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established crite-
ria” (Presidency Conclusions, June 2003). Moreover, the Thessaloniki Agenda for the 
Western Balkans was approved. The purpose was to further strengthen the privileged 
relations of the EU and the Balkan states, and to enrich the framework for the Euro-
pean course of these countries, up to their future accession (without specifying the 
dates of accession). The Agenda mentioned the upcoming historic enlargement of the 
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EU to the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and indicated that this event 
should become an inspiration for the countries of the Western Balkans. Nonetheless, 
the document remarked that the pace of the integration with the EU depends only on 
themselves (EU – Western Balkans Summit). One of the tools to intensify the stabiliza-
tion and association process, identified in the Thessaloniki Agenda, was the European 
Partnership (covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia and Kosovo) (Council Regulation, 
(EC) No. 533/2004).
In the following years, satisfaction was expressed with the progress made by the 
Balkan countries in the stabilization and association process and in their adjustment 
efforts aimed at reaching the EU standards. Declarations about the “European future” 
of the region were repeated, for example, at the EU – Western Balkans summit held 
in March 2006 in Salzburg (Salzburg EU/Western Balkans) or during the ministerial 
meeting which took place in Sarajevo in June 2010 (EU to reaffirm).
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the 
enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans has been constantly giving way to 
topics that were more important for the Member States. Internal reforms, the economic 
and financial situation (along with reacting to the global economic crisis and the crisis 
in the euro area), the refugee-migration crisis, the fight against terrorism, Brexit – the 
biggest attention was paid to these issues in the public debate.2 It also, on the one hand, 
affected the ability of the European Union to absorb new members and, on the other 
hand, weakened the attractiveness of membership in the organization. Especially since 
Jean-Claude Juncker, taking over the office of the President of the European Commis-
sion in 2014, clearly stated, “The EU needs to take a break from enlargement so that 
we can consolidate what has been achieved among 28. This is why, under my Presi-
dency of the Commission, ongoing negotiation will continue, and notably the Western 
Balkans need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take 
place over the next five years” (Juncker, 2014, p. 12).
So far, the European perspective of the Western Balkans did come true only for 
Croatia which became the 28th Member State of the European Union on 1 July 2013. 
One of the most important implications of Croatia’s accession has been the continua-
tion (though not very dynamic) of the Balkan direction in the EU’s enlargement policy 
(Górecki, 2016, p. 190), which may strengthen Zagreb’s position as a link between 
the Union and the region (Żornaczuk, 2013, pp. 1–2). Mainly, because other Balkan 
countries also taken up the integration challenge. The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia received the candidate country status on 16 December 2005, Montenegro 
on 17 December 2010, Serbia on 1 March 2012 and Albania on 27 June 2014. Moreo-
ver, Montenegro and Serbia are already conducting accession negotiations. In addi-
2 More information about the EU’s crises and their consequences: Stolarczyk M. (2012), 
Implikacje kryzysu Unii Europejskiej dla dalszego procesu integracji, “Krakowskie Studia 
Międzynarodowe,” no. 3; Kryzysy w procesie integracji europejskiej i sposoby ich przezwyciężania 
(2015), eds. K. A. Wojtaszczyk, J. Nadolska, Warszawa; Fiszer J. M. (2015), Kryzys integracji eu-
ropejskiej czy kryzys Unii Europejskiej? Przesłanki i skutki, “Przegląd Europejski,” no. 3 (37); Sto-
larczyk M. (2016), Główne przyczyny i przejawy kryzysów w Unii Europejskiej oraz ich implikacje 
dla dalszego procesu integracji europejskiej, “Roczniki Nauk Społecznych,” t. 8 (44), no. 3.
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tion, two countries are still considered as potential candidates for membership in the 
European Union: Kosovo (cooperating with the EU, inter alia, under the Stabilization 
and Association Process) and Bosnia and Herzegovina which decided to submit an ac-
cession application in 2016 (Enlargement).
Notwithstanding, attention should be paid to the fact that the enlargement issue was 
again raised by the European Union at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. 
On 6 February 2018 a new document was presented: A credible enlargement perspec-
tive for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans. Thus, it was recalled 
that a credible prospect of enlargement requires credible efforts and reform in the 
Western Balkans along with the European Union’s support (European Commission, 
COM (2018) 65). It was highlighted that, “the future of the region as an integral part of 
the EU is in the Union’s very own political, security and economic interest. The EU’s 
enlargement policy is part and parcel of the larger strategy to strengthen the Union by 
2025” (Ibidem). The document also set out six flagship initiatives to be implemented in 
2018–2020, regarding: the rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic devel-
opment, transport and energy connectivity, the Digital Agenda and reconciliation and 
good neighbourly relations. They are considered as “new prospects for resolving old 
challenges” (Żornaczuk, 2018, pp. 1–2).
What is more, in May 2018 in Sofia – for the first time since 2003 – the official 
summit EU – Western Balkans was organized. The new dynamics in the enlargement 
policy (also confirmed by the relevant conclusions adopted by the Council on 26 June 
2018) may have at least several reasons. First one: the ineffectiveness of previous 
activities and the increase of the Euroscepticism in the Balkan countries, as a con-
sequence of the too distant prospect of membership. Secondly, the need to achieve 
(despite numerous conflicts and crises) any success in the EU’s policy. An last but not 
least – in the face of the EU’s passivity – Russia, Turkey and China have strengthened 
their influences in that area (Western Balkans to 2025).
Bosnia and Herzegovina in perception of the European Union
Since the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential candidate country 
for the membership in the European Union (in 2003), both sides have signed a number 
of agreements and arrangements regulating bilateral cooperation. In 2004 the country 
was covered by the European Partnership (verified in 2006 and 2008) On 25 Novem-
ber 2005 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was launched, which was signed 
on 16 June 2008 with the trade and trade-related issues agreement (that part of the deal 
entered into force on 1 July 2008). However, the proper agreement entered into force 
on 1 June 2015.
On 18 September 2007 visa facilitation and readmission agreements were signed, 
which entered into force at the beginning of 2008. In addition, from 15 December 2010 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have biometric passports can visa-free travel 
within the Schengen area.
Moreover, on 27 June 2012 both sides started the High-Level Dialogue on the Ac-
cession Process. That, among others, contributed to submitting by Bosnia and Herze-
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govina on 15 February 2016 an application for membership in the European Union. 
On 20 September 2016 the European Council asked the European Commission to give 
its opinion on this application. On 9 December 2016 the country received an appropri-
ate questionnaire from the Commission, which – together with the responses – was 
returned in February 2018 (Enlargement – Bosnia and Herzegovina).
While awaiting for the European Commission’s avis regarding the application, it is 
worth paying attention to the issues raised by the Commission in its regular (annual) 
reports on the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria (political criterion – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, respect for human rights, respect and protect of national minorities; economic 
criterion – functioning market economy, ability to cope with market competition with-
in the EU; legal criterion – ability to accept and fulfil obligations resulting from mem-
bership, striving to achieve political, economic and monetary goals of integration) 
(Presidency Conclusions, June 1993). Numerous reservations were raised in almost 
every field that was covered by the analysis.
The first of the reports, presented in 2011, highlighted primarily the limited progress 
in implementing the European Partnership priorities, which required the implementa-
tion of measures to achieve more functional and sustainable institutional structures, 
as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including harmoniza-
tion of the constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, it 
pointed out: the existence of a long-term process of establishing legislative and execu-
tive power and the lack of government at the state level which diminish law-making 
capacity; lack of a common political vision of the directions of the state’s develop-
ment; slow reforms in the field of public administration and fragmentation as well 
as politicization of the civil service; little progress in the judiciary reforms; lack of 
effectiveness of anti-corruption activities; little progress in improving the enforcement 
of international human rights legislation and the need to reform the prison system 
(European Commission, SEC (2011) 1206). Similar issues were noted in the following 
years: through the fragmentation of power, political consensus about its functioning 
(also at the local level) has still not been achieved. The Commission noted, in addition, 
an imbalance in the protection of rights – economic and social rights are respected, 
labour rights should be strengthened, but minority discrimination is widespread, al-
though the minorities are protected better (European Commission, COM (2012) 600; 
European Commission, COM (2013) 700).
Regarding to the economic criterion, in 2011 firstly noted was the frailty of the con-
sensus about the foundations of the country’s economic and fiscal policy. Furthermore, 
the economic weakness of Bosnia and Herzegovina was mentioned, manifesting itself 
in unfavourable macroeconomic results of the country, rising inflation, poor condition 
of the labour market, high level of unemployment or the existence of an unfavour-
able business environment (low rule of law, corruption). The ability to cope with the 
competition on the EU market was undermined, but the high level of trade integration 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union was noted (European Com-
mission, SEC (2011) 1206). Also in the following years insufficient progress was made 
to meet the economic criteria, especially in the scope of functioning of the free market 
economy. Coping with the competition forces of the EU market (in the long-term) 
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would be possible for the country only after determined economic reforms (European 
Commission, COM (2012) 600; European Commission, COM (2013) 700).
Numerous inconsistencies and maladaptation were mentioned in 2011 also in rela-
tion to the fulfilment of the legal criterion (European Commission, SEC (2011) 1206). 
It was further emphasized that due to the lack of political support for the European 
perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a very limited progress in terms 
of alignment with the EU law and the EU standards. Discrepancies have arisen par-
ticularly in the areas of veterinary policy and food safety policy, competition, public 
procurement, energy, the environment and climate change, transport, employment, and 
social policy (European Commission, COM (2012) 600; European Commission, COM 
(2013) 700).
These problems were also noted in 2014 (European Commission, COM (2014) 
700), 2015 (European Commission, SWD (2015) 214) and 2016 (European Commis-
sion, SWD (2016) 365). The last of the regular reports was published in 2018.
Once again, the report pointed out many weaknesses of the political and economic 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the maladjustment of its legislation to the EU 
law. The Commission’s remarks mainly concerned:
the impossibility to achieve a political consensus by the state (the Presidency, the  –
Council of Ministers) about both foreign policy and internal affairs;
small progress in implementing the public administration reform; further fragmen- –
tation of civil services increases the risk of politicization;
little progress in implementing the judiciary reform; –
little progress in the implementation of anti-corruption and organized crime leg- –
islation;
some progress in the protection of human rights and minority issues; however, fur- –
ther efforts are needed in the area of freedom of expression, especially in the face 
of political pressure and intimidation of journalists, including verbal and physical 
attacks; ineffective implementation of the law on prevention and protection against 
gender-based violence;
some progress in terms of economic development and competitiveness, but the  –
state is still in the early stages of creating a functioning market economy;
some progress in improving the situation of the business environment and strength- –
ening the financial sector; however, there is still a weak rule of law, divided and 
inefficient public administration, a serious imbalance in the labour market, as well 
as a weak education system that does not support the investment climate; great 
importance of the informal economy;
some progress towards achieving the capacity to cope with the competitive pres- –
sure and market forces in the European Union; nevertheless: small expenditures 
are incurred for education, research and development; visible underinvestment of 
human capital, deficits in the field of transport and energy infrastructure; low rate 
of structural adjustments (European Commission, SWD (2018) 155).
Therefore, it can be stated that the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
reports prepared by the European Commission is not particularly favourable. Mean-
while, the opinion issued by that EU institution (avis) may set the direction for the 
further integration of the state with the European Union (the Commission’s recom-
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mendations are usually taken into account by the European Council, giving the status 
of a candidate country, although not necessarily when the case concerns starting the 
accession negotiations).
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a very general and extensive approach to the 
Copenhagen criteria (which level of fulfilment shapes the Commission’s avis) makes 
it impossible to interpret them unequivocally. The European Council did not develop 
precise indicators, by which the criteria would be verified. On the one hand, this may 
cause a threat of delaying the beginning of the accession procedure by the European 
Union, while on the other hand – it gives Bosnia and Herzegovina a chance that the 
state’s application will not be rejected.
Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the European Union:  
opportunities and challenges. Selected issues
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the state with the most complicated structure of 
the system and political situation in the Western Balkans – the goal of the agreement 
developed in Dayton in 1995 was to create a framework in which three ethnic and 
political communities (Bosnians, Croats and Serbs), previously fighting in a civil war, 
could operate seamlessly as a state (Gavrić, Banović, Barreiro, 2013, pp. 16–17). Un-
der this agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina functions as an union of two entities: the 
Republika Srpska and, the Bosnian and Croatian, Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which are subordinated to a centralized government with limited competences 
(Bojkov, 2003, pp. 42–43). In 2000 the Brczko District, which is directly subordinated 
to the central power, was also separated, being the third component of the federation, 
though without taking this fact into account by the constitution.
The aim of the agreement prepared in 1995 by the presidents of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Serbia and Croatia, under the auspices of the international community, was (in 
the face of the ongoing war) primarily preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. 
Dayton agreement imposed the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, creating weak 
central institutions and two units. Established constitutional order, institutionalizing 
the multiethnicity of the state and leaving to its parts a lot of autonomy (although the 
constitution itself does not specify the competences of entities; Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) is a subject of constant criticism and enables articulating further 
independence aspirations of particular groups (Eralp, 2012, pp. 31–37). Nevertheless, 
it remains nearly unchanged (Muś, 2013, pp. 91–96).
Multiethnicity and equality of all communities at the highest level mean for in-
stance holding the office of the head of the state by a collegial body. A number of 
specific provision have been introduced to functioning of the Parliamentary Assembly, 
also the constitutional court is not lacking of originality (Krysieniel, 2014, pp. 48–51). 
However, it should be noted that the main consequence of the constitutional provisions 
for the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the occurrence of many ele-
ments, which are called directly dysfunctional. Krzysztof Krysieniel mentions among 
them, “a) creating two units (entities) with different territorial and administrative struc-
tures […]; b) converting Bosnia and Herzegovina into a semi-protectorate through 
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establishing an institution of the High Representative of the International Community 
[…]; c) no decision concerning the territorial affiliation of the strategically located 
city of Brczko […]; d) weak central authorities, resulting in, for example, difficulties 
with unification of the army and police services, border control, the introduction of the 
single currency, and even passports; e) differences in the political system of Republika 
Srpska and the Federation which lead to discrimination on the basis of nationality, re-
ligion, and even education or economics; f) an extremely complicated way of making 
decisions” (Krysieniel, 2010, pp. 167–168).
Solutions aiming at enabling the functioning of the state, in practice lead to the 
paralysis of the political process – an extensive institutional system (also at the compo-
nent level of the country) provides many opportunities for blocking political initiatives 
(Stanisławski, Szpala, 2009, pp. 27–30) or developing corruption. In the Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2017 Bosnia and Herzegovina was classified on the 91st position 
– only the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was ranked below as an European 
country, on the 107th place (Corruption Perceptions Index). According to estimates 
from 2014, 22.9% of adult citizens were urged to give a bribe, from whom 15.9% suc-
cumbed that pressure (Anti-Corruption).
The main factor that blocks the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
the European Union is therefore the political situation of that country. Wojciech 
Stanisławski and Marta Szpala, analysing the sources of the crisis in contemporary 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointed out several basic causes of the “Bosnian chaos.” 
First of all, that country still has not dealt with the legacy of the civil war in 1992–
1995, the free market modernization of the economy and the democratization of the 
state. Moreover, the political elites do not seek to overcome conflicts, but to preserve 
them. Secondly, there are fundamental differences between the Bosnian and Serbian 
political forces in understanding the national interest. As the third reason analysts 
point out the contradiction in the activities of the international community, which – 
on the one hand – strives to establish a post-war order in the state and – on the other 
hand – recognizes the right to subjectivity of nations living in it (Stanisławski, Szpa-
la, 2009, pp. 5–7). However, the researchers suggest that, “it seems highly probable 
that the international community (including the EU in the first place) will be given 
the ungrateful role of the stabilizer, which is not ready to impose complex political 
solutions for the conflicted political elites of BiH, but was forced to take responsi-
bility for the inability to independent functioning of the area” (Ibidem). The fact is 
that EU activities are a permanent element of the region’s stabilization system and 
“the Western Balkan countries represent a special challenge for the EU and require 
its continued commitment, both political and financial, to work towards political and 
economic stability and to support the process of system transformation in the region” 
(Bałkany Zachodnie).
Ethnic division and political rivalry within individual communities are also asso-
ciated with diverse concepts of functioning of the state in general: the Bosnian elites 
are mainly in favour of the “unitarist” concept (full unification of Bosnia and Herze-
govina), while the Serbian elites promote the federalist vision of the country and main-
taining a wide autonomy for the Serbian part (Stanisławski, 2008, p. 42). Regularly 
returning are the proposals to divide the country (Sarajlic-Maglic, 2011, p. 54) and 
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distribute it to other entities.3 The strong and so far unresolved political conflict is seen 
by the citizens as the corruption and ineffectiveness of the political class playing only 
inter-ethnic animosities. Combined with the difficult economic situation, it led to the 
largest since the end of the civil war demonstrations at the beginning of the 2014 (Dz-
idic, 2014). The state’s inability to cope with the effects of the flood that appeared in 
the Western Balkans in May 2014 did not reduce the public frustration (Jukic, 2014).
Despite the fact that integration with the European Union is finally perceived as a prior-
ity for the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (it was possible to work out a relative po-
litical consensus which can be proved by applying for the EU membership), the accession 
process itself is interwoven with fundamental problems related to the discrepancy vision of 
the future of the state and the progressive erosion of its institutions (Babić, 2011, p. 132).
The failure of the institutional system which is functioning in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
confirms that in the long term tensions may become a challenge for the international com-
munity, mainly for the European Union from which a greater degree of determination in 
imposing specific legal, systemic and administrative solutions will be required (especially 
because the risk of stopping the integration process does not change the proceeding of the 
political elites) (Stanisławski, 2008, pp. 48–49). However, the EU actions for the domes-
tic dialogue on constitutional reforms and a clear indication that the cooperation of the 
country’s authorities in the field of democratization will strengthen the prospect of rap-
prochement with the EU, should be continued (Joniewicz, Żornaczuk, 2012, pp. 1–2).
It could be also valuable to hold a referendum among the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which would express the public opinion on the issue of the integration 
of the state with the European Union. Recognition of integration as the overriding 
goal of the whole country’s society may additionally serve as one of the most effective 
forms of pressure on the ruling elite (Babić, 2011, p. 154). Especially because in 2010 
the 88.2% of the citizens of the country were supporters of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
membership in the EU (88.2% of the citizens). However, the low level of advance-
ment of the integration caused the decline in favour towards state’s accession (Balkan 
Barometer 2017), although the European Union is still perceived as a recipe for many 
problems affecting the country (Public Opinion Poll Results).
Considering such fundamental issues – concerning even the shape of the state – it 
is difficult to expect that specific requirements resulting from the political Copenhagen 
criterion will be met. However, it should be noted that in the case of the Balkan states 
the European Union – in assessing the progress made by candidate and potential can-
didate countries – also takes into account the cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the advancement of regional cooperation. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina achieves acceptable results in both these fields according to 
the European Commission. In 2011 the Commission stated that the country’s work 
with the ICTY was satisfactory (a number of important steps were taken to trial the 
war crimes) and that the state “continued to participate actively in regional coopera-
tion and to maintain good neighbourly relations” (although further, determined actions 
3 These proposals relate to the concept of division of the state promoted in early 1990s by the 
Croatian President, Franjo Tudman. More information: P. Żurek (2011), Bośnia i Hercegowina w wizji 
politycznej Franjo Tudmana, in: Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton. Przeszłość – teraźniejszość 
– perspektywy, eds. P. Chmielewski, S. L. Szczesio, Łódź.
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were necessary in some cases, for example related to borders) (European Commission, 
SEC (2011) 1206, p. 23). The bilateral relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the 
majority of countries in the region in 2018 were similarly assessed. However, there are 
doubts about whether the inter-Balkan relations are indeed stable, or they are merely 
an ostensible success of the European Union in that area (Szpala, 2011).
Furthermore, in the reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina the European Commission 
regularly draws attention to the country’s insufficient compliance of the requirements 
included in the economical Copenhagen criteria. Deficits in the functioning of the free 
market reduce (unless they completely undermine) also the state’s ability to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces in the European Union.
Other analysts also pay attention to similar issues. The economy of the state is 
recognized not only on the scale of the EU, but also on the world scale as an uncom-
petitive. In The Global Competitiveness Index 2017–2018 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was ranked on the 103rd position (The Global Competitiveness Report). Innovations 
also are not included in the specificity of the country – The Global Innovation Index 
2017 placed Sarajevo on the 86th place (The Global Innovation Index). Unfavourable 
role in improving that situation play for example inefficient government bureaucracy, 
corruption, instability of governments and policies, tax regulations, access to financing 
or inadequate education of the workforce, considered as the main obstacles to business 
operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina. Key Indicators).
The economic weakness of Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially in comparison to 
the EU Member States) represents the GDP per capita index, measured by the pur-
chasing power parity of residents. It needs to be highlighted that this factor, among 
others, affects on the amount of funds allocated for particular countries in the EU 
budged under the cohesion policy.
In 2010 that country reached only 29% of the EU average in this category, while 
in 2017 it was 32%. This is a result that is incomparable to that achieved annually 
by Luxembourg and also significantly lower than the result of Bulgaria which is the 
least developed Member State of the European Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
this measure slightly lags behind the other candidate countries. However, it may be 
a chance for Sarajevo that Albania, which has recorded weaker results, in 2014 was 
granted the status of a candidate country.
Table 1
GDP per capita (PPS, %) in 2010–2017 in the European Union and Balkan candidate 
and potential candidate countries
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
UE-28 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
lU 257 265 260 261 270 267 257 253
BG 44 45 46 46 47 47 49 49
ME 41 42 39 41 41 42 45 46
XS 36 37 37 38 37 36 37 37
MH 34 34 34 35 36 36 37 37
BA 29 30 30 30 30 30 31 32
Al 29 29 30 29 30 29 29 29
Data source: Eurostat, GDP per capita in PPS, Ec.europa.eu, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?ta
b=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1, 30.06.2018.
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At the same time it is worth noting that Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second 
decade of the 21st century achieves relatively good macroeconomic results. In terms of 
inflation, public debt or budget deficit, its results are frequently better than results of 
the other EU Member States.
However, attention should be paid to several issues. Relative macroeconomic balance 
(both in terms of fiscal and monetary policy) is the basic condition for the state to receive 
external financing. Bosnia and Herzegovina whereas is eager to use, among others, the 
credit lines and financial support from the International Monetary Fund. For example: in 
2016 the country received from the IMF, under the Extended Fund Facility, 555.3 million 
EUR (for three years) to implement the structural reform program, improve fiscal policy and 
strengthen the financial sector (IMF Executive Board Approves). The funds were directed 
primarily at the following activities: improving the functioning of the business environment 
in order to create jobs in the private sector and increase the growth potential; ensuring fiscal 
stability and improving the quality of government spending as well as securing financial 
stability, and reviving bank loans. In addition, “an important cross-cutting theme in the pro-
gram are measures that strengthen the single economic space of BiH, in accordance with the 
constitutional setup an competencies of respective institutions” (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Tranches are unlocked after realizing the program’s objectives (IMF discusses unlocking 
loans) and these are possible – especially in the case of Sarajevo – only after reaching 
a political consensus. The experience of that country (e.g. in relation to difficulties with 
forming the government at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century) indicates 
that, “politicians in BiH are able to reach a compromise only in the case of a direct threat 
of collapse of the state finances. This will probably be used during granting BiH financial 
aid by the EU or the IMF – one should therefore expect it to be strictly conditioned by the 
introduction of economic and systemic reforms” (Szpala, 2012).
The relatively stable economic situation of the state, reflected by the basic macroeco-
nomic results, being a derivative and a requirement of international institutions financing 
reforms in Sarajevo, can not, however, obscure the real problems that the economy of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina must face. The basic one, which also resonates on the social 
situation of the country, is the high unemployment rate – much higher that the EU aver-
age and the results of the particular Member States which are the most favourable in this 
category (Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic). Nevertheless, comparable with the 
countries that were most severely affected by the economic crisis (Spain, Greece).
Table 2
Unemployment rate (%) in 2010–2017 in the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
UE-28  9,6  9,7 10,5 10,9 10,2  9,4  8,6  7,6
Best result  4,6
(AT)
 4,6
(AT)
 4,9
(AT)
 5,2
(DE)
 5,0
(DE)
 4,6
(DE)
 4,0
(CZ)
 2,9
(CZ)
Worst result 19,9
(ES)
21,4
(ES)
24,8
(ES)
27,5
(GR)
26,5
(GR)
24,9
(GR)
23,6
(GR)
21,5
(GR)
BA 27,2 27,6 28,0 27,4 27,5 26,2 25,0 b/d
Data source: Eurostat, Total unemployment rate (%), Ec.europa.eu, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.
do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00203&plugin=1, 30.06.2018; The World Bank, Unem-
ployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate), Data.worldbank.org, https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=BA&name_desc=false, 30.06.2018.
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to define the credibility of this data in relation to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Especially considering the estimates that even 1/3 of the country’s 
GDP may be additionally generated by the informal economy (Medina, Schneider, 
2018, p. 69), in which up to 37% of employees with other legal sources of income can 
be involved (Hidden Economy, 2016, p. 4). It is practically impossible to calculate 
what percentage of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s citizens actually (from not only em-
ployed, but also the unemployed) drives the “shadow economy” income. Moreover, 
the political, economic and social situation of the country is conducive to the function-
ing of organized crime, intensified during the war in the last decade of the 20th century 
and still remaining a major problem in the second decade of the 21st century (Brady, 
2012, pp. 16–23). However, in this context, Bosnia and Hercegovina is similar to other 
countries of the Balkan region (Stojarova, 2007, p. 98).
Taking that into account, as well as the significant disproportions in the level of the 
economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Member States, the 
biggest doubts concern whether this organization is able – in the second decade of the 
21st century – to generate further deposits of (financial) solidarity (Molendowski, 2012, 
p. 38). On the one hand, the Union has the mission to support the well-being of its peo-
ples and “the economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between the Mem-
ber States” (Treaty on European Union, article 3). It also feels responsible for moderate 
stabilization of the situation in its environment – thanks to that Sarajevo already received 
412 million EUR in 2001–2006 under the CARDS program, 656 million EUR in 2007–
2013 under the IPA initiative and 167 million EUR in 2014–2017 from IPA II (excluding 
funds for cross-border activities) (Bosnia and Herzegovina – financial assistance).
On the other hand, more and more intense discussion about the EU budget, polari-
zation of opinions about the cohesion policy or common agricultural policy, internal 
division into members of the euro zone and countries outside of it, controversies about 
the distribution of funds between members of the “old” and the “new” Union and 
development disparities between the countries of the Western Europe and Central and 
Eastern Europe confirm, that the organization should focus on the consumption of pre-
vious enlargements and the elimination of existing differences. In the face of numerous 
internal conflicts and crisis (also with the financial background) among the Member 
States, enlargement policy is not a priority for the Union. The priority should be to 
strengthen, also weakened, the EU solidarity,4 what is being recalled by the part of the 
European leaders and the leaders of the various EU institutions.
Summary: the EU perspective not for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
As it was previously mentioned, the 2018 strategy indicated that enlargement pol-
icy is one of the ways of strengthening the European Union by year 2025. It added 
4 Read more: A. Raspotnik, M. Jacob, L. Ventura (2012), The issue of solidarity in the European 
Union, “TEPSA Brief,” 8.08.2012; Solidarity in the European Union: Challenges and Perspectives 
(2017), ed. A. Giannakopoulos, “Research Paper,” no. 9, The S. Daniel Abraham Center for Interna-
tional and Regional Studies, July; Solidarity in Europe. Citizens’ Responses in Times of Crisis (2018), 
eds. Ch. Lahusen, M. T. Grasso, Cham.
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that “with strong political will, delivery of real and sustained reforms, and definitive 
solutions to disputes with neighbours, Serbia and Montenegro could potentially be 
ready for membership by this date,” but “accession is and will remain a merit-based 
process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each country” (Euro-
pean Commission, COM (2018) 65, p. 17). Can Bosnia and Herzegovina also take 
advantage from intensifying the EU enlargement policy? The strategy only emphasises 
that, “with sustained effort and engagement, Bosnia and Herzegovina could become 
a candidate for accession” (Ibidem, p. 7). These (rather general) declarations can again 
be seen as maintaining the “European perspective” for the Western Balkans, which has 
been already put in a time frame for two countries. That is a novelty in the European 
Union’s policy towards the region, which may be the premise for strengthening moti-
vation and commitment to the implementation of adjustment processes by both sides, 
the Balkan states as well as the EU.
In relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should be emphasized that the difficult 
political, economic and social situation still implies a low level of fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen criteria. In June 2018 the Council of the European Union underlined 
that, “the Council welcomes the adoption of some EU-oriented reforms in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 20) and that, “the Coun-
cil further reiterates its unequivocal commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU 
perspective as a single, united and sovereign country” (Ibidem, p. 22). However, the 
Council also revealed many problems of this state (the Council “encourages all au-
thorities and political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina to overcome divisive rheto-
ric rooted in the past, to end the glorification of convicted war criminals as well as to 
actively promote reconciliation”) (Ibidem) and pointed out numerous deficits in its 
functioning (“the Council notes with concern that divisive rhetoric and pre-electoral 
campaigning have significantly slowed down the pace of reforms, particularly as 
regard the Reform Agenda”) (Ibidem, p. 20). Shortcomings have been reported in 
relation to (inter alia) socio-economic reforms, the rule of law, anti-corruption and 
organized crime fight, combating radicalization and terrorism, the functioning of 
public administration, protection of freedom of expression and building independ-
ent media, electoral law provisions, hostile business environment, lack of common 
economic space, fragmented regulatory environment, and imbalances in the labour 
market (Ibidem, pp. 21–23).
Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, it is worth the risk to state – taking into 
account the experience of other Balkan countries – that Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
soon be granted the status of the EU candidate country, which obviously will not guar-
antee accession in the foreseeable future. This status (as a confirmation of the rela-
tively high level of advancement on the European integration for a country staying 
outside the organization) may, for the conflicted Bosnian political forces, motivate and 
justify reforms and become an ultimate platform for cooperation. It seems that, “in the 
face of internal contradictions, the lack of shared vision of the state and a full willing-
ness to cooperate between constitutive nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a chance 
to survive only when it becomes a part of a larger, supranational organism – the Eu-
ropean Union” (Krysieniel, 2011, p. 478). However, any further steps on the road to 
full integration will require the state’s maturity (coherence) in perceiving the national 
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interest, what is still difficult at the end of the second decade of the 21st century – after 
more than twenty years after the constitution of the Daytonian order.
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Summary
In 2018 the European Union (EU) recalled that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the 
EU. The vision of an “European (Union) future” was announced to the Balkan countries fifteen 
years earlier, in 2003, when they were recognized as a potential candidates for membership in 
the EU.
In 2016 Sarajevo decided to apply for membership in the European Union. Therefore, the 
main aim of this article is to analyse the possibility of joining the EU by Bosnia and Herze-
govina. It is necessary to identify – even if chosen – opportunities and challenges, perspectives 
and barriers on the path to further integration of that country with Brussels. The background of 
these considerations must be the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans region, which lost its 
dynamics with the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, and is trying to retrieve 
if for various reasons nowadays. Will Bosnia and Herzegovina benefit from the intensification 
of the EU’s enlargement policy?
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Integracja Bośni i Hercegowiny z Unią Europejską: szanse, wyzwania i perspektywy 
 
Streszczenie
W 2018 roku Unia Europejska (UE) przypomniała, że przyszłość Bałkanów Zachodnich 
znajduje się w UE. Perspektywa „europejskiej (unijnej) przyszłości” została zaprezentowana 
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państwom bałkańskim już piętnaście lat wcześniej, w 2003 roku, kiedy to zostały one uznane 
za państwa potencjalnie kandydujące do członkostwa w UE.
W 2016 roku Sarajewo zawnioskowało o akcesję do Unii Europejskiej. Głównym celem 
niniejszego artykułu jest zatem analiza możliwości przystąpienia Bośni i Hercegowiny do UE. 
Niezbędne jest zidentyfikowanie – chociażby wybranych – szans i wyzwań, perspektyw i barier 
na drodze do dalszej integracji tego państwa z Brukselą. Tłem dla rozważań musi stać się poli-
tyka Unii Europejskiej wobec regionu Bałkanów Zachodnich, która straciła na dynamice wraz 
z początkiem drugiej dekady XXI wieku, by w jej końcu próbować ją (z różnych względów) 
odzyskać. Czy na intensyfikacji polityki rozszerzenia UE może skorzystać Bośnia i Hercego-
wina?
 
Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska; polityka rozszerzenia UE; Bośnia i Hercegowina; Bałkany 
Zachodnie
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